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State Court and Administrative
Medicaid Litigation
A Case Study
By Steven C. Perils
This case began, like many cases, inno-cently enough. Between the two ofthem, Mr. and Mrs. Client had more
than the approximate $79,000 "com-
munity spouse resource allowance"
that Mrs. Client was allowed to keep under Medi-
caid (in addition to the $2,000 "nonexempt
resources" by reason of his being the nursing home
spouse). In fact, the two of them had a total of around
$105,000, consisting primarily of eight jointly owned
CDs of varying amounts and maturity dates, as well
as swampland in Mississippi owned solely by Mr.
Client. The choice had been made to ask the Depart-
ment of Public Aid to consider Mr. Client's
application for Medicaid eligibility. This was done
with the realization that the excess assets would re-
sult in an automatic denial, leading to an inevitable
hearing in front of a hearing officer of the Depart-
ment to determine whether to approve the
application under the circumstances.
Steven C. Peris is a certified elder law attorney and
the founder of the Family Center for Elder Law in
Arlington Heights, Illinois. Perlis is a member of the
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys and a
former member of its Board of Directors. He has
focused his legal expertise on helping senior citizens and
people with disabilities and has authored numerous
articles concerning various aspects of elder law.
Initial Denial
In early November 1996, Public Aid issued the ex-
pected denial notice. The caseworker gave us the
impression that there was nothing left except the is-
sue of whether the excess resources should or should
not be transferred to Mrs. Client.
Pending (Not Yet Enacted) Illinois Regulation
Regarding Spousal Impoverishment
As time was passing, our office became concerned
about a proposed change to the state regulation af-
fecting spousal impoverishment cases.1 This
regulation, which was enacted after all of this was
over, would require the community spouse to do a
calculation based on the purchase of an actuarially
sound single-premium life insurance annuity. As it
turned out, this regulation never was a factor in the
history or development of this case.
The Medicaid Fair Hearing-April 24, 1997
At the appeal hearing, after some initial confusion
about the correct application date and asset amount,
our office and the Department were able to agree
upon an application date of November 27, 1996,
and $89,732.40 as the relevant nonexempt asset
amount. I explained our contention that Mrs. Client's
income was so far below the maximum income al-
lowance that she needed all of her husband's and
her assets combined (and then some) to get her in-
come closer to the community spouse income
allowance. The Department offered nothing to
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refute this and the hearing then concluded. The Hear-
ing Officer gave every impression that he had all of
the information he needed to render his decision.
Administrative Reorganization of Appeals
and Medical Determinations
At the same time, we became aware of a proposed
reorganization within the Public Aid Department.
As of July 1, 1997, the Illinois Department of Public
Aid (IDPA) and Illinois Department of Human Ser-
vices (IDHS) were to separate from each other.
Medical eligibility determinations and administra-
tive appeals would no longer be handled by the same
agency. The General Counsel assured me that this
matter would eventually be sorted out, but in the
beginning, there might be some delays and confu-
sion in adjusting to this new administrative hierarchy.
The Mandamus Lawsuit-Filed on
February 19, 1998, before Judge Jaffe
On February 6, 1998, due to the pressure from the
Facility and from the pharmacy, and influenced as
well by the uncertainty of waiting, Mrs. Client de-
cided to pursue court action against the State. By
then, the facility's bill had increased to around
$70,000 and there was a large pharmacy bill as well.
Also, on this date, we prepared the Complaint
for Mandamus. We faxed a copy of this Complaint
to the General Counsel for the Department. At this
point, the General Counsel suggested that the State
might oppose us based on a Federal consent decree.2
He hinted that monthly fines for noncompliance with
the timeliness requirements were the sole remedy cli-
ents could seek and that any other course of action
could result in a dismissal. Ultimately, however, the
General Counsel agreed that the State would likely
not assert this as a defense in this particular matter.
The complaint was filed on February 19, 1998.
Interestingly, on February 22, 1998, our office re-
ceived a copy of the State's Final Administrative
Decision. This decision sent the case back to the local
Medicaid agency. This decision was incomprehen-
sible, since by law, only the hearing officer could
allow assets in excess of the community spouse re-
sources allowance to be diverted to the community
spouse.
Medicaid Administrative Review Case-
Filed March 19, 1998, before Judge Durkin
We filed our appeal of the hearing officer's decision
in the form of a Complaint for Administrative
Review on March 19, 1998. By now, the State's at-
torneys were speaking optimistically about a quick
and favorable settlement.
Events Leading up to the Involuntary
Transfer Hearing
On April 23, a notice of involuntary transfer by rea-
son of nonpayment was issued from the nursing home
through its attorneys. On April 27, our office for-
mally appealed that notice to the Illinois Department
of Public Health.
By the first week of May, the Department of
Public Aid had orally agreed to settle the Medicaid
administrative review case, effective back to June 1,
1996. Unfortunately, the nursing home and its coun-
sel continued to press ahead with their involuntary
transfer action in spite of this development.
Involuntary Transfer Hearing-May 4, 1998
The involuntary discharge hearing occurred at the
resident's nursing home. Our office asserted that
Federal and State law makes it impermissible for the
nursing home to involuntarily transfer a resident
while Medicaid eligibility has not yet been finally
determined,3 and that the Federal Medicaid statu-
tory provisions says basically the same thing.
On June 4, our office spoke to Mrs. Client. She
informed us that Mr. Client was now admitted to Hos-
pice and the attending nurse had discussed with her
the possibility of withdrawing his tracheotomy tube.
On June 19, our office received a copy of the
Order of Dismissal and Stipulation in the Medicaid
administrative review case, agreeing to payment back
to June 1, 1996, and faxed it to the nursing home
attorney.
On June 22, our office received a copy of the
Hearing Officer's written decision permitting the in-
voluntary transfer of Mr. Client. This decision stated
that only Medicaid recipients, and not Medicaid
applicants, are legally protected from involuntary
transfers. This decision gave Mr. Client ten days to
move out. Our office quickly appealed.
Administrative Review Action-
Filed June 25, 1998, before Judge Hett
On June 25, 1998, we filed Mr. Client's complaint
and scheduled an emergency motion for a restrain-
ing order at a hearing on June 29. At this hearing,
we argued the emergency motion and the attorney
for Public Aid informed the court that an official
settlement could be expected within thirty days.
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The nursing home attorney appeared and con-
firmed that the facility was proceeding with its
request for involuntary discharge. We argued that
the Court should apply the balancing test frequently
used in cases where injunctive relief is being sought.
We argued that the harm to the resident in allowing
an involuntary transfer would be life threatening,
permanent, and irreparable. By comparison, the nurs-
ing home would suffer relatively little harm in waiting
a short time for payment to be made and favorable
action had virtually been assured. The Court found
our argument persuasive and granted a temporary
restraining order in our favor.
On June 30, we prepared a Motion to Clarify
Agreed Order and Stipulation of Settlement against
Public Aid. The nursing home administrator signed
the affidavit supporting this motion. On July 9, we
appeared before Judge Durkin for argument. The
State tried to contend that it should not be held in
contempt since it had essentially complied with the
agreed-upon court order of June 15. The court was
not persuaded and ruled that Public Aid was to take
steps to comply with the court's order by July 17.
Mr. Client was ordered to submit any and all group-
care credit information to Public Aid by July 24, and
Public Aid was to mail payment to the nursing home
no later than July 31.
On July 15, the attorney for Public Aid informed
us that a prepayment report should be issued for the
August fiscal month, but a check could not be issued
before July 31. The initial restraining order was later
extended until July 29, 1998.
Hearing to Extend Restraining Order-
July 29, 1998
On July 29, we appeared seeking another extension
on the restraining order. The attorney for Public Aid
informed the court that the remaining issue appeared
to be the prepayment report. Again, the court al-
lowed an extension, this time until September 5,
1998.
Contempt Action against Medicaid Agency
On July 16, we scheduled a Motion For Rule to Show
Cause against Public Aid. On August 3, the hearing
on the contempt action against the State was ex-
tended to August 27. The attorney for Public Aid
provided us with the Prepayment Report. For some
unexplained reason, it appeared to omit the period
of June 1, 1996 to November 12, 1996.
Final Flurry of Effort to Get Information to
Medicaid Agency
On August 27, we spoke to the attorney represent-
ing Public Health. When we told her about the
payment voucher information our office had just
received, she told us that Public Health would cite
the nursing home if they continued to pursue invol-
untary transfer once payment had been made.
Our Unsuccessful Effort to Continue
Despite the Resident's Death
Our office spoke to Mrs. Client on August 8, when
she informed us that the feeding tube had been re-
moved from Mr. Client on August 4. He died nineteen
days later.
On September 3, we presented a Motion for In-
structions. We argued that a significant number of
individuals were potentially at risk as a result of the
recent onslaught of involuntary transfers of residents
awaiting word for Medicaid. Thus, the court could
invoke the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine and appoint a special administrator to
present oral argument and otherwise conclude this
matter on its merits. Therefore, the court could make
its ruling notwithstanding the recent death of the
resident. The court declined to go in that direction,
however, and dismissed the action.
Money Damages Lawsuit in Unrelated
State Court Case
The Facility pushed ahead on its money damages
lawsuit in the Third Municipal District. While this
case was still pending, we were able to convince Pub-
lic Aid to pay the nursing home retroactively to June
1, 1996. It turned out that somebody at the nursing
home had erroneously told Public Aid that Medi-
care (and not Medicaid) covered that time period
when, in fact, it did not. Once this had occurred, we
were able to tell the court that the nursing home had
been, or would be, paid in full. The nursing home's
suit was dismissed shortly after that.
Early 1999 Decision in a Different Case
Involving the Same Nursing Home
Chicago attorney Janna S. Dutton was able to suc-
ceed at the hearing level where we had not been
successful less than a year before. She reported that
her client applied for Medicaid in October, 1998.
The application was denied, not for substantive rea-
sons, but because an uncooperative daughter would
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not release financial information she had in her ex-
clusive possession as power of attorney for her
mother. The Hearing Officer, the same officer as in
our hearing, concluded that as long as the Medicaid
application had been filed prior to the discharge
notice, and as long as the application, once approved,
would cover all arrearages, then the nursing home's
action would be dismissed.4 In fact, this dismissal
motion was brought, and the officer ruled in favor
of the resident and dismissed the nursing home's
action.
Furthermore, the nursing home had committed
other technical notice errors under the administra-
tive regulations. These included its failure to give the
requisite thirty-day notice before giving the twenty-
one-day notice. The nursing home had not discussed
its proposed action with any of the family members.
The notice from the nursing home was going to dis-
charge the resident to the home of the daughter,
although she had never consented to this proposed
action.
Conclusion
If it appears to you that this case was enormously
expensive to the client and time-consuming to all
involved, then you are right. I would like to think
that the client's death did not totally nullify all of
our effort and expense. The favorable outcome in
the recent involuntary discharge case seems to sig-
nify a renewed willingness on Public Health's part
to throw out a nursing home's attempt to involun-
tarily discharge a Medicaid-pending resident based
on nonpayment of the resident's bill there.
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